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1 Introduction
This is a technical report on formulating a continuous time overlapping generations (OLG)
model with an underlying time-varying demographic population, whose growth (positive
or negative) is inﬂuenced by policy variables selected by a social planner.
The report is part of a larger research program designed to help uncover the opti-
mal policy decisions and welfare implications of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. There is an
enormous amount of work on the economic eﬀects of the disease in the literature, much
of it focusing on modeling, the measurement of the economic and welfare costs, and the
allocation of resources to treatment vs. prevention investment. Perhaps not surprisingly,
there is at present no consensus on how best to model the economic eﬀects of the disease,
and diﬀerent sub-disciplines of economic and socio-economic analysis have generated dif-
ferent standards. For example, the International Monetary Fund’s The Macroeconomics
of HIV/AIDS [Haacker 2004] contains a variety of neoclassical models which assess both
the economic and welfare consequences of HIV/AIDS, concluding that the disease has
dire consequences for growth, income, life expectancy, and the development of human
capital (see also Nattrass [2006] for a review of Haacker [2004], where this negative con-
clusion is criticized). The use of growth models to study the eﬀects of HIV/AIDS is also
adopted in Arndt and Lewis [2000] (a Computable General Equilibrium model and sim-
ulation), Robalino, Jenkins and Marouﬁ [2002] (a calibrated neoclassical growth model),
and McDonald and Roberts [2006], Dixon, McDonald and Roberts [2001] (a linearized
augmented Solow growth model). Generally, all of these modeling environments measure
large negative eﬀects on growth and income from the disease, even if the prevalence of
HIV/AIDS in the population is relatively small.
The eﬀects of the pandemic upon the development of capital are treated in Bell and
Gersbach [2006], who use a discrete time OLG framework to argue for greater targeting
of susceptible subgroups of the population to combat the disease. By contrast, Bonnel
[2000] examines the interplay between physical, human and social capital, and concludes
that HIV/AIDS can destroy the social fabric of an economy, in particular its institutions,
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as well as both the physical and human capital stock of the economy.
Both Arrow [2003] and Kirman, Luchini and Moatti [2003] advocate the use of welfare
analysis to understand the costs of HIV/AIDS, with Kirman et al. [2003] concentrat-
ing upon the possible role of greater treatment of those already infected with HIV/AIDS
(through e.g. anti-retroviral treatment), as this provides a higher quality of life and/or in-
crease longevity for those with the disease. This welfare role is also taken up in Deininger,
Crommelynck and Kempaka [2005] and in Crafts and Haacker [2003], who include in agent
preferences a desire for longer life expectancy to assess the welfare costs of increased
disease mortality. They ﬁnd, again, that the welfare losses due to HIV/AIDS can be
substantial.
On the ‘prevention vs. treatment’ debate there is no clear-cut conclusion, as the
economic costing which accompanies discussions of prevention are often balanced by the
purely welfare gains from treatment. In an interesting policy prescription, Oster [2005]
highlights the possibility of reducing the impact of HIV/AIDS through prevention, by
targeting the spread of other sexually transmitted diseases (which may then prevent the
spread of the disease). In order to assess whether or not treatment or prevention should
receive most attention, Canning [2006] advocates a greater reliance upon cost-eﬀectiveness
as a strategy to assess the impact of alternative investments into prevention or treatment
of the disease (or of alternative investments between diﬀerent diseases or health crises),
and Gaﬀeo [2003] supports its use while also examining the eﬀects of market failure and
HIV/AIDS’ long incubation period on the ability to form a cost-eﬀectiveness strategy. By
contrast, Kumaranayake and Watts [2001] state that data availability (at least for Sub-
Saharan Africa) is too poor to allow cost-eﬀectiveness a role in policy formation, and Dike
[2002] examines many of the challenges facing researchers in collecting both quantitative
and qualitative data (particularly in developing nations).
Nevertheless, some form of cost-eﬀectiveness has been adopted for regional and sectoral
studies, e.g. on the demand for food [Agbola, Damoense and Saini 2004], the impact on
the agricultural sector [Ambert 2002], or on the construction sector [Jayne, Villarreal,
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Pingali and Hemrich 2005]. In the health care sector, DeSimone and Schumacher [2004]
estimate the wage diﬀerential which results from the added risk of health care practitioners
(particularly nurses) being exposed to HIV/AIDS.
Finally, substantial resources have been devoted to combating HIV/AIDS by non-
governmental organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the World Bank. In their assessment of
aid eﬀectiveness (see e.g. World Bank Operations Evaluation Department [2005], OECD
Development Assistance Committee and UNAIDS [2004], Over et al. [2004]), it is generally
concluded that eﬀectiveness of aid can be increased by improving the institutions of the
developing nation that is combating the disease, while at the same time improving both
monitoring and evaluation of the aid package. This emphasis on institutional development
is also reinforced by Godinho et al. [2005].
Overall, there are a plethora of modeling environments to choose from, but what
appears to be lacking is a single framework which can make many of questions outlined
above (e.g. cost-eﬀectiveness vs. welfare, prevention vs. treatment) outcomes of the
model rather than modeling choices of the researcher. In addition, few of the above
models use results provided by the mathematical biology and epidemiology literature on
the spread and diﬀusion of HIV/AIDS–these literatures themselves often compute simple,
sometimes ad hoc estimates of both the economic cost of the disease and its welfare eﬀects.
It would be beneﬁcial, then, to propose a unifying framework which could combine the
relative merits of both approaches, and this research project aims to provide a meaningful
contribution to ﬁll this gap.
The mechanism by which the eﬀects of HIV/AIDS, or indeed of any infectious disease,
is modeled in the current study will be well understood by most (if not all) economists,
but the modeling from epidemiology and its demographic eﬀects may not be. In addition,
the particular welfare measurement environment adopted here, the continuous time OLG
framework, is relatively novel in the literature. The overall goal of this framework is to
allow the following questions to be addressed:
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1. What resources, and in what form, should be dedicated to the ﬁght against the
HIV/AIDS pandemic, if such resources are to come from the productive output of
an economy (an economy deﬁned here as a region, province, nation, or group of
nations)?
2. Because resources are scarce, is there a way to measure the trade-oﬀ which must
take place when such resources are devoted to combating HIV/AIDS, that takes into
account not only the eﬀects on the here-and-now, but on future generations to come?
In particular, what is the trade-oﬀ between investment in treatment, investment in
prevention, and investment in other alternative resource allocation projects?
3. Can we meaningfully measure the cost (in terms of welfare, production, life ex-
pectancy, per-capita income, health, etc.) of an additional incremental increase in
the funding of policies designed to combat HIV/AIDS?
4. Can these measurements be modularized, i.e. can new innovations in our under-
standing of both the optimal policies and of the disease itself be incorporated into
a modeling framework with a minimum of ‘retooling’ required?
5. Can this model be computed in a time frame which allows policy makers to assess
alternative policy tools, so that in addition to its descriptive capacity the model
also provides predictive power through simulation?
This report will not travel far along the road towards a complete characterization of
the answers to the above questions. But it is hoped that the reader will see how such
a (relatively) simple framework as that described below can be extended to incorporate
more realistic features, and at the same time provide insights on how to eventually use
this framework in actual policy-making decisions of such crucial importance as combating
HIV/AIDS.
The structure of this paper is the following: Section 2 provides a characterization of
the full demographic model, a continuous time OLG framework with population growth
aﬀected by the HIV/AIDS disease. Already here several simpliﬁcations are made, e.g.
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capital is absent and there is no subjective discounting performed by the social planner
(so that future generations are valued equally highly as current generations),1 and the
social planner has a ﬁnite planning horizon with a known terminal condition.
After introducing the full model, which is analyzed and treated elsewhere, Section 3
develops a much-simpliﬁed version of the model in which a single population of agents does
not suﬀer from disease, but simply from mortality, and the social planner can implement
policy to aﬀect the rate of mortality loss. In a sense this is a super-aggregated version
of the full model, as we could (for example) just think of this single population as ‘the’
population of the economy, and the mortality rate as ‘the’ mortality rate for this overall
population. Policy impacts would thus take place at this super-aggregated level–this
might model, say, the overall impact of an anti-infectious disease campaign on the entire
population’s mortality rate.
Although radically simpliﬁed from the full model given in section 2, this single popu-
lation model shares the feature from the full model that the welfare valuation of the social
planner depends upon the entire distribution of individuals according to their age, which
is (in this context) a continuum. The dynamics of this model are most properly studied at
the theoretical level as a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system over a Hilbert space. We defer
this analysis to a later paper, noting in passing that such systems have in fact been studied
in Economics in the past (e.g. Faggian [2005]). What we show in Section 4, and what is
the main result, is that in spite of this complication it is possible to numerically compute
this Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system on a computer using ﬁnite-diﬀerence methods for
solving ﬁrst-order, nonlinear partial diﬀerential equations.
The ﬁnal section, which is still work in progress, will be a demonstration of the scale
at which the model can be computed using high performance computing resources at
Manchester Computing (the University of Manchester, UK) and the National Center for
Supercomputing Applications (the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). Cur-
rently available desktop solutions (e.g. Linux or other *nix systems running at approx.
1Note, however, that there is discounting in the model, though, as the population suﬀers from a
mortality rate which cannot be extinguished.
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2Ghz clock speed on dual-core CPUs, with 2GB RAM) indicate that both computation
of the solution and even storage of the results is a serious consideration when solving the
relatively simple problem derived in Section 3. When the high performance computing
results are complete they will be included in an expanded version of this document, which
is always available at http://www.ihs.ac.at/~shorish.
2 A Welfare Model of HIV/AIDS
The following model is a synthesis of what might be termed ‘conventional demographic
growth models’ on the one hand, and ‘models of demographic epidemiology’ on the other,
applied to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Economic growth models are usually analyzed within
the context of ‘welfare’, which is a way of measuring the preferences of a population of
inhabitants in a well-deﬁned, axiomatic fashion. While there is (and will no doubt always
be) a certain degree of debate over whether or not human welfare can be measured in this
way, it is clear that as long as humans have some structure over how they rank alternatives
(be they alternative decisions, consumption goods, careers, etc.), this structure should not
be ignored if at all possible.
For the current model we adopt a weaker contention than that humans ‘actually’
rank alternatives using a welfare measure such as utility, and instead deﬁne a social
planner’s measurement of others’ welfare by such a measure. In the present context, we
think of a social planner as a government or non-governmental agency which has at its
disposal a technology allowing it to aﬀect large sections of the population of agents at a
time, through economic policy. The social planner funds this policy activity by collecting
resources made available in the economy, so that the policy is constrained both by the
sum total of resources available, and also by the alternative uses (e.g. alternative policies
or activities) that those resources could be allocated.
Underlying this social planning problem (as it is known) is the assumption that a
proportion of the population is suﬀering from HIV/AIDS. We adopt a standard framework
from epidemiology and mathematical biology and suppose that there exist three categories
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of people, those susceptible to infection, those infected with HIV but not expressing AIDS,
and those who have acquired infection and are now expressing AIDS.
Transitions between these populations are the main mechanism by which the disease
progresses, and are the target of any economic policy designed to combat this progression.
For example, HIV carries with it a force of infection, which indicates how (over a small time
interval) susceptible population members become infected with HIV. In this transition
is usually included the transmission of HIV through sexual contact (heterosexual and
homosexual), intravenous drug use (needle sharing), and mother-to-child transmission of
the virus during pregnancy. Economic policies which are targeted to one or more of these
transmission mechanisms, then, are directly targeting the force of infection.
In addition, there is a force of expression of HIV into AIDS, which indicates how many
HIV-infected population members express AIDS. Here again there is scope for economic
policy, because of the use of e.g. anti-retroviral drug therapy can delay the onset of AIDS
many years after an HIV infection, leading to a higher quality of life through increased
longevity.
Finally, there is a latent mortality rate for all three categories which humans can do
nothing about, or which are aﬀected by other factors not represented by economic policy
prescriptions against HIV/AIDS. These terms are present in the demographic evolution
of all three populations, and are dependent not only upon the population type but also
upon their age.
2.1 A Mathematical Formulation
The demographic model of infectious disease adopted here is based upon a class of mod-
els introduced in 1927 by Kermack and McKendrick [1991] which are a standard of the
epidemiology literature. This model is extended to allow age-dependent disease incidence
and progression, as in Inaba [2006] (see also Bacae¨r and Ye [2006], Garnett and Anderson
[1993], Anderson [1991], Inaba [1990, 1989], Tudor [1985] and Hoppensteadt [1974] for an
overview of the progression of similar models in the epidemiology literature). The popu-
7
lation is classiﬁed according to the stage of the infection–in the literature on HIV/AIDS
there are commonly three categories, or ‘compartments’ which any individual will be
classiﬁed, and individuals move between categories according to certain transitions (or
transition probabilities). This analysis focuses upon three categories:
1. Susceptibles: these population members are currently uninfected by the disease,
but may catch the disease in the future. They are given by a density s(t, x) of the
population at time t and age x, with x ≤ t always.
2. Infecteds: these members are infected with the HIV virus, but do not yet exhibit
acquired infections, i.e. they do not exhibit the symptoms of AIDS. There is a
density i(t, τ, x) of infecteds, which indicates at time t the proportion of population
members who were infected with HIV at age x, τ periods earlier. Obviously it must
be that x + τ ≤ t, since here the age of the individual is x + τ .
3. Acquireds: these members are infected with HIV and moreover exhibit the symp-
toms of AIDS–their quality of life and mortality are suﬃciently diﬀerent from HIV-
infected-only agents that they have a category of their own. The density of acquireds
a(t, τ, x) deﬁnes the fraction of the population at time t who began exhibiting AIDS
at age x, τ periods ago. As before, x + τ ≤ t.
As the population is measured in terms of densities it must be true that
∫ t
0
(
s(t, x) +
∫ x
0
i(t, τ, x− τ)dτ +
∫ x
0
a(t, τ, x− τ)dτ
)
dx = 1 ∀t, (2.1)
since i(t, τ, x − τ) and a(t, τ, x − τ) represent the density of individuals at t of infecteds
and aquireds, respectively, who were infected x − τ periods before, i.e. who are of age x
at t.
Each of these densities (s, i and a) evolves according to the transition from one state
to the next (s → i → a) and also to the absorbing state “death”, represented by mortality
rate transitions. We take as given the following full speciﬁcation of the transitions between
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states, where certain transitions may be inﬂuenced by a vector of policy variables denoted
p(t):
d
dt
s(t, x) =
(
∂
∂t
+
∂
∂x
)
s(t, x) = − [µ(x) + λ(x, p(t))] s(t, x), (2.2)
d
dt
i(t, τ, x) =
(
∂
∂t
+
∂
∂τ
)
i(t, τ, x) = − [µ(x + τ) + γ(τ, x, p(t))] i(t, τ, x), (2.3)
d
dt
a(t, τ, x) =
(
∂
∂t
+
∂
∂τ
)
a(t, τ, x) = − [µ(x + τ) + δ(τ, x, p(t))] a(t, τ, x), (2.4)
s(0, x) = S0(x), s(t, 0) = B(t). (2.5)
In the above system the ‘instantaneous mortality rate’ µ(x) denotes that part of the
population’s mortality rate which is independent of policy and is uninﬂuenced by disease.
In (2.2) µ(x) depends upon the age of the population x, while in (2.3) and (2.4) µ(x+ τ)
denotes those population members who were of age x when infected τ periods, before, i.e.
those who are of age x + τ now.
There is also an additional mortality rate term δ(τ, x, p(t)) in (2.4), which is introduced
because those population members who exhibit AIDS are more likely to die (given their
age) than either HIV infected or uninfected individuals. This term depends upon the
time AIDS has been exhibited (τ), the age at which the individual ﬁrst exhibited AIDS
(x), and the policy variable p(t)–the latter dependence is due to the possibility of e.g.
anti-retroviral treatment extending the lifespan of those with AIDS.
The terms λ(x, p(t)) and γ(τ, x, p(t)) are forces of infection and acquisition, indicat-
ing the likelihood of a susceptible becoming infected with HIV and the likelihood of an
HIV-infected person exhibiting AIDS, respectively. It is in these two terms, along with
δ(τ, x, p(t)), that policy devoted to combating HIV/AIDS has its greatest impact–it is
also in these terms that modern epidemiology, sociology, and economics have the most
to say. Indeed, entire research agendas (not just individual research articles) are devoted
to understanding these rates, and no full explanation of the ability of a social planner
to inﬂuence the progression of such a disease can be considered realistic without this un-
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derstanding. We shall unfortunately not treat this question in the current analysis, as
our focus is on the general welfare analysis methodology once λ(x, p(t)), γ(τ, x, p(t)), and
δ(τ, x, p(t)) are completely speciﬁed. But these are absolutely vital for our understanding
of how to combat the disease.
Finally, S0(x) and B(t) indicate the initial distribution of susceptibles at time t = 0
and the reproduction rate for every period t, respectively.
The innovation we have introduced into the age-weighted demographic model is to
include the policy variable p(t), which may be a vector of policy tools, explicitly into
the forces of infection and acquisition, and into the mortality rate adjustment for those
exhibiting AIDS.2 We next turn to how a social planner selects p(t) in an optimal fashion.
The continuous time nature of the infectious disease lends support to the adoption
of a continuous time OLG growth model framework, with an endogenous labor supply
(see Brito and Dilao [2006] for an example of a continuous time OLG model of demo-
graphic population growth for an exchange economy). This allows the social planner to
use standard tools in optimal control theory to solve the following resource allocation
problem: given a speciﬁcation for the economy, what is the optimal resource investment
towards combating HIV/AIDS? Notice that the natural response, ‘as much as possible’,
is uninformative on its own, but is exactly what we wish to know–how much is ‘as much
as possible’, exactly?
The social planner arrives at an answer by measuring the welfare of the population,
and constructing trade-oﬀs between beneﬁts that the population would receive directly
from an economy’s production (by consuming goods), and beneﬁts received by forgoing
consumption and battling the disease instead (these beneﬁts are measured both for pre-
vention, by lowering the risk of infection of future generations, and also for treatment, by
improving the current quality of life of those already infected).
2Lloyd [1991] derives optimal policy instruments in a simpler model where HIV infected agents respond
to policy decisions on the part of a social planner. While we feel this policy response is an important
determinant of the overall impact of policy decisions upon the evolution of the disease, we incorporate
this eﬀect into the force of infection and acquisition terms given above–one might term these the ‘net
policy eﬀects’ after agent responses are incorporated.
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This welfare measure is assumed to be time separable and additive:
U =
∫ T
t
∫ v
0
[
us(cs(v, x))s(v, x) + ui(ci(v, x))
∫ x
0
i(v, τ, x− τ)dτ (2.6)
+ ua(ca(v, x))
∫ x
0
a(v, τ, x− τ)dτ
]
dxdv.
The social planner measures an individual’s welfare with the utility functions us, ui and ua,
for susceptibles, infecteds and acquireds, respectively, which take as respective arguments
the per capita consumption levels cs, ci and ca. The above welfare measure U is simply
a weighted average of the welfare of everyone in the economy over all three types, for all
overlapping generations which exist between time t and the ﬁnite horizon of the social
planner, T . As usual, we assume that the utility functions are at least C1, strictly
increasing and concave in consumption.
The economic trade-oﬀs for the social planner’s decision problem are captured in
the economy’s resource constraint. This is a neoclassical aggregate resource constraint,
and states that in any time period, the sum of current population consumption and
the funding devoted to reducing the mortality rate of the population cannot exceed the
available resources of the economy:
∫ t
0
[
cs(t, x)s(t, x)dx + ci(t, x)
∫ x
0
i(v, τ, x− τ)dτ+ (2.7)
ca(t, x)
∫ x
0
a(v, τ, x− τ)dτ
]
dx + C(p(t)) ≤ F
(∫ t¯
t
s(t, x)dx
)
,
where C(p(t)) is the resource cost of selecting the policy vector p(t), F (·) is the production
function of the economy (assumed to be either constant or decreasing returns to scale),
and [t, t¯] is the interval between which agents are of working age (and thus contribute to
production).
Finally, we can state the full optimal control problem of the social planner. The
planner selects a set of consumption levels for every individual in the economy at every
time period, as well as a vector of policy variables (also at every time period) to maximize
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the welfare of the population. This is expressed as an optimal control problem, where the
solution, the optimal value function, is given by:
V := max
{cs,ci,ca,p}
∫ T
t
∫ v
0
[
us(cs(v, x))s(v, x) + ui(ci(v, x))
∫ x
0
i(v, τ, x− τ)dτ (2.8)
+ ua(ca(v, x))
∫ x
0
a(v, τ, x− τ)dτ
]
dxdv,
such that (2.2) - (2.5) and (2.7) hold, and it is understood that by e.g. ‘cs’ we mean the
entire family of values cs(v, x) for all times v ∈ [t, T ] and all ages x ∈ [0, v].
The formulation of this problem is similar to previous studies on the optimal con-
trol (treatment) of infectious disease age-structured models studied in, for example, Fe-
ichtinger, Tragler and Veliov [2003] and Faggian and Gozzi [2004], with the additional
complexity of an overlapping generations framework and a resource allocation problem.
The model is complicated by the dependence of the value function upon the current state
of the population s(t, x), which makes the resulting dynamic programming problem (see
below) inﬁnite dimensional. Both Feichtinger et al. [2003] and Faggian and Gozzi [2004]
tackle the necessary conditions for similar problems, while Faggian [2005] outlines regular
solutions for a general class of convex boundary control problems over a Hilbert space
(this builds upon earlier research on the Hamilton-Jacobi system in inﬁnite dimensional
spaces from Crandall and Lions [1985]). It is not known at present if these results can be
extended in a straightforward fashion to demonstrate the existence of regular solutions to
the above system.
3 The Simplified Model
For this report we shall make several further assumptions that will help simplify the
analysis, and (it is hoped) signiﬁcantly improve expositional clarity. Strictly speaking,
these simpliﬁcations will recast the demographic problem away from infectious disease, as
there will be only a single population of uninfected agents s(t, x). This population will,
12
nevertheless, have its mortality rate inﬂuenced by economic policy, so that the economic
tradeoﬀ between greater current living conditions for the present or a lower mortality
rate in the future is still present. Moreover, passing from this simpliﬁed model to the full
model just described preserves both the numerical approximation methodology and the
computational implementation strategy–this is, of course another way of saying that even
this simpliﬁed model has as much complexity as the full model.
We make the following assumptions. First, we assume that there is only one type of
population, the uninfected (no longer ‘susceptible’ since there is no threat of infection).
This population density, which will be denoted (as before) by s(t, x), has an associated
mortality rate µ(x, p(t)) which is inﬂuenced by policy. There is no birth rate and the
mortality rate is always positive, so in this model the initial distribution of agents S0(x)
always declines over time. The social planner may mitigate this decline by an optimal
choice of p(t), as described below.
To keep policy analysis simple we suppose that p(t) is a scalar and C(p(t)) = p(t).
Moreover, we let F (x) = x ∀x, t = 0 and t¯ = t, so that the resource constraint may be
simpliﬁed to ∫ t
0
c(t, x)s(t, x)dx + p(t) ≤
∫ t
0
s(t, x)dx = 1. (3.1)
The policy variable p(t) inﬂuences the demography of the economy only by impacting
the mortality rate of the population. In a full compartment model of infectious disease
this may be a vector of policy variables (as deﬁned earlier), and diﬀerent stages of a
disease will be impacted by one or more of these variables. Here we assume that there is
only one ‘compartment’, which is a population of generic individuals who age over time.
We model the demographic change of the population as:
d
dt
s(t, x) =
∂s
∂t
dt +
∂s
∂x
dx = −µ(t, x)s(t, x)dt,
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which (since dx = dt) can be written as the partial diﬀerential equation (PDE) system
(
∂
∂t
+
∂
∂x
)
s(t, x) = −µ(x, p(t))s(t, x). (3.2)
The term µ(x, p(t)) is the instantaneous mortality rate of the population–given a policy
p(t) at time t, the fraction of the population of age x will be adjusted downward at the
rate −µ(x, p(t)). One form of the mortality rate will be speciﬁed in the modeling section
below, but for now we note that it is the impact of the policy variable upon the transition
rate of the population, in this case the mortality rate, which is the demographic impact of
economic policy. Although in a more complete model the impact of e.g. high consumption
on mortality or on reproduction could be considered, we abstract away from this in what
follows.
Finally, we suppose that there is in the current model no new births in the population,
i.e. the population of the economy is at its maximum at t = 0, with an initial population
distribution s(0, x) := S0(x). This assumption is for exposition only, and a full model
would include a birth rate that could be inﬂuenced by economic policy.
3.1 The Optimal Control Problem
With these assumptions in hand, for the remainder of this analysis we consider the fol-
lowing optimal control problem:
v(t, s) := max
c,p
∫ T
t
∫ v
0
u(c(v, x))s(v, x)dxdv (3.3)
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such that
∫ t
0
c(t, x)s(t, x)dx + p(t) ≤ 1, (3.4)
ds
dt
=
∂s
∂t
+
∂s
∂x
= −µ(x, p(t))s(t, x), (3.5)
v(T, ·) = VT (x), s(0, x) = S0(x) (3.6)∫ t
0
s(t, x)dx = 1 ∀t. (3.7)
This class of optimal control problems represents the decision problem facing a social
planner with a ﬁnite planning horizon and a continuum of agents indexed by age. The
instantaneous utility function u(c) is assumed to be increasing and strictly concave–in
the numerical computations below the functional form is given the standard u(c) := ln(c)
speciﬁcation. This utility function is assumed to be the same for every age cohort, an
assumption made for exposition only and which can be safely dispensed with in more
realistic models.
The resource constraint (3.4) has been likewise simpliﬁed–we assume a closed economy,
so that the policy maker only has at their disposal the output of a domestic economy.
There is no capital, so only the available labor supply inﬂuences production. To keep our
attention focused upon the problem of computation, the production function is assumed
to be linear in aggregate labor and the linear multiplier is set equal to one without loss of
generality. It should also be emphasized that although s(t, x) is a density function (i.e.,
the number of agents in a small age-interval (x, x+dx) at time t is equal to s(t, x)dx), the
consumption levels c(t, x) are aggregate per-capita levels and not densities. This means,
for instance, that the resource constraint has the equivalent form
Es(t,·)c(t, ·) = 1− p(t). (3.8)
The problem is non-standard because the value function v(t, s) depends upon every
value of the density of susceptibles s(t, x) for each x–the state space is thus a continuum.
Naturally in any computation using a ﬁnite state machine the state space will have to be
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discretized, and the nature of the discretization will be addressed in the upcoming section.
The convergence properties of the numerical approximation to the true value function is
a subject of future research, however, and caution should be used in mapping numerical
computational results back to the theoretical problem at hand.
To render the problem easier to treat numerically we can recast the problem as a
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman ﬁrst order nonlinear partial diﬀerential equation. We arrive at:
−∂v
∂t
= max
c,p
{∫ t
0
u(c(t, x)s(t, x)dx +
∫ t
0
∂v
∂s
· (−µ(x, p(t)))s(t, x)dx
}
(3.9)
such that constraints (3.4), (3.6) and (3.7) are satisﬁed. We have slightly abused notation
here to highlight that there is a continuum of partial derivatives of v with respect to s in
the last term of (3.9), so the second integral may be considered as an inner product on
an Hilbert space between the gradient of the value function deﬁned over the space of all
probability densities over x, and the representative draw from this space labeled s(t, x)
(multiplied by µ(x, p(t)). The proper deﬁnition of this derivative will be presented below,
when passing to the discretization for numerical computation.
3.2 Deriving s(t, x) when the Policy Function is Known
If the trajectory of p(t) is known for all t (or is irrelevant for the time evolution of s(t, x))
then solving for the density function of susceptibles s(t, x) is straightforward using the
method of characteristics to convert the partial diﬀerential equation (3.5) into a set of
ordinary diﬀerential equations. This separates the time evolution of the demographic
component from the policy decisions, as is often performed in standard economic models
with (say) an exogenously deﬁned rate of population growth. We next brieﬂy outline how
the population of susceptibles would evolve in the absence of policy–for further references
on the method of characteristics see e.g. John [2005].
The characteristic curve deﬁnes a mapping from a parameter z ∈ R to (x(z), t(z)),
values for which the unknown density S is unchanging over time. Hence,
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ds
dz
=
∂s
∂t
dt
dz
+
∂s
∂x
dx
dz
. (3.10)
But from (3.5) we can match coeﬃcients, yielding
dt
dz
= 1, (3.11)
dx
dz
= 1, (3.12)
ds
dz
= −µ(x(z), p(t(z)))s(x(z), t(z)). (3.13)
The ﬁrst two ordinary diﬀerential equations may be integrated to yield
t(z) = z + t0, (3.14)
x(z) = z + x0. (3.15)
We choose the constant of integration t0 = 0, which allows us to write
x(z) = x(t, x0) = t + x0. (3.16)
Meanwhile, the last ODE can also be integrated, choosing as the limits of integration
(0, t):
ln(s) = −
∫ t
0
µ(x(z), p(t(z)))dz + S0, (3.17)
with S0 a constant.
To determine the constant of integration we use (3.16) and the initial condition for
s(0, x) from (3.6):
s(0, x(0, x0)) = S0(x0). (3.18)
Finally, we know that x = t + x0 → x0 = x− t, so that
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s(t, x) = exp
[
−
∫ t
0
µ(z + x0, p(z))dz
]
+ S0(x0),
or
s(t, x) = exp
[
−
∫ t
0
µ(z + x− t, p(z))dz
]
+ S0(x− t). (3.19)
The susceptible population at t is thus determined when the policy function p(t) is
known for every time period up to t. Unfortunately, the value of the policy function is
itself determined by the time evolution of the susceptible population, and for the actual
optimal control problem the standard technique outlined here cannot be used.
3.3 First Order Conditions
The ﬁrst order necessary conditions to solve system (3.3) - (3.7) rely upon slightly refor-
mulating the HJB system (3.9) using a Lagrange multiplier to incorporate the resource
constraint. The Lagrangian is deﬁned as:
L(c, p, s, λ) := ∂v
∂t
+ max
c,p
{∫ t
0
u(c(t, x))s(t, x)dx +
∫ t
0
∂v
∂s
· (−µ(x, p(t)))s(t, x)dx (3.20)
+ λ
[
1−
∫ t
0
c(t, x)s(t, x)dx− p(t)
]}
,
such that (3.6), (3.7) hold. Note that at the optimum, the Lagrangian is equal to zero.
Provided that the problem carries an interior solution for points oﬀ the boundary, the
ﬁrst order necessary conditions associated with this problem may be written as:
∂u
∂c
∣∣∣∣
(t,x)
=
∂v
∂s
(
−∂µ
∂p
)∣∣∣∣
(t,x)
,
∫ t
0
c(t, x)s(t, x)dx + p(t) = 1. (3.21)
If we assume that u(c) := ln(c), the conditions may be rewritten in terms of the
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optimal policies c∗(t, x) and p∗(t) as
c∗(t, x) =
[
∂v
∂s
(
−∂µ
∂p
)∣∣∣∣
(t,x)
]−1
,
p∗(t) = 1−
∫ t
0
[
∂v
∂s
(
−∂µ
∂p
)∣∣∣∣
(t,x)
]−1
s(t, x)dx. (3.22)
4 Numerical Dynamic Programming
4.1 Fixing the Mortality Rate µ
The analytical treatment of the ﬁrst order conditions and the existence of a solution are
treated in a companion paper. The focus of this report is to determine how to compute
the solutions of (3.21) on a computer, given the functional forms for production and
utility assumed above. In order to embark upon computation an additional functional
form assumption must be made for µ(x, p). In a sense this expression is the ‘heart’ of the
economics, for all policy eﬀects to change the progression of the demographic population
variable s(t, x) are given by this term.3
To keep the exposition as clear as possible we assume that µ(x, p) has a simple form
which represents the following stylized qualities:
1. the mortality rate is decreasing and convex in the policy variable p, i.e.
∂µ
∂p
≤ 0, ∂
2µ
∂p2
≥ 0,
2. the mortality rate is maximized when p = 0, i.e.
µ(x, 0) > µ(x, p) ∀p,
3As mentioned earlier, in the complete model of the epidemiology of infectious disease, economic
policy will have an impact upon non-disease-related mortality, disease-related mortality, and the ‘force
of infection’, i.e. the rate at which those susceptible to disease are actually infected.
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3. the mortality rate tends to a lower bound as p goes to inﬁnity, i.e.
lim
p→∞
µ(x, p) =: µ¯(x) < µ(x, p) ∀p.
These stylized qualities are designed to capture the eﬀects of a policy with clearly-
deﬁned eﬀects on the mortality rate, without externalities or distortions. Naturally in
the real world policy eﬀects are less clear-cut, and some ambiguity will obtain regarding
not only the optimal policy level with respect to aggregate consumption (as here) but
also with respect to deleterious (or unanticipated) eﬀects that the policy might have upon
mortality. Without such externalities, the qualities given above state that increased pol-
icy spending decreases mortality, but does so at a declining rate. For every age cohort,
the mortality rate is maximized when no policy spending is implemented, while if pol-
icy spending were totally unconstrained (so that an inﬁnite amount could be allocated)
then the mortality rate would decline to a ﬁxed (age dependent) minimum. The latter
assumption prevents the ‘eternal youth’ problem of allowing the mortality rate to decline
to zero with unbounded policy spending, which retains the common-sense intuition that
regardless of what we do, there are uninsurable risks which cannot be eliminated by policy
spending.
For computation, we further restrict µ(x, p) to an explicit functional form that respects
the stylized qualities deﬁned above:
Assumption 4.1. The instantaneous mortality rate µ(x, p) is deﬁned as:
µ(x, p) := (1 + x2)(1 + e−p). (4.1)
Note that in addition to satisfying the qualities required for the policy function, this
functional form also states that mortality is increasing and convex in age (x). Although
plausible, it is worth noting here that this functional form assumption is made for ease
of computation only (that is, it facilitates the calculation of an exact gradient of µ).
Indeed, recall that all of the important demographic eﬀects are captured by µ, and so the
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functional form of µ with respect to x is most properly a data-driven speciﬁcation rather
than a modeling speciﬁcation. It is assumed that when the model is implemented as a
full-scale policy engine, the researcher will identify precisely that µ(x, p) which best ﬁts
the data on age-weighted and policy-inﬂuenced mortality. In the ﬁnal analysis, discovering
the true speciﬁcation of µ(x, p) is an econometric question which can only be given by
the data.
4.2 Computing the Value Function
As with most ﬁnite horizon dynamic programming problems we begin at the end and
work backwards. Starting from the terminal condition v(T, ·) = VT (x) we solve
c∗(T, x) =
[
∂VT
∂s
(
−∂µ
∂p
)∣∣∣∣
(T,x)
]−1
,
p∗(T ) = 1−
∫ T
0
[
∂VT
∂s
(
−∂µ
∂p
)∣∣∣∣
(T,x)
]−1
s(T, x)dx, (4.2)
for every possible s(T, x) such that
∫ T
0
s(T, x)dx = 1. Of course, here we run immediately
into the problem that no matter how many s(T, x) families we compute, there are always a
continuum more waiting in the wings. On a ﬁnite state computing machine, unfortunately,
we must approximate the entire space of possible populations by a ﬁnite grid, and ‘only’
compute values on the grid.
To this end, we ﬁrst deﬁne the range of the population density function s(t, x) by the
interval [0, s¯], and deﬁne a set Ps of ns grid points from this set. Note that the upper
limit s¯ can prevent sharply-peaked probability density functions from being considered–
but in demographic models with birth and death processes there are normally fairly widely
dispersed distributions. For notational exposition we shall denote a typical value from Ps
by sj ∈ Ps, for j = 1, . . . , ns.
Thus, each possible value of s(t, x) is constrained to lie on the grid of dimension ns
over [0, s¯]. But there is a second complication which is potentially more serious than
constraining the values of s(t, x), and that is the problem that the dimension of the state
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space as required for v(t, s) is given by the mapping between the underlying age x and
s(·, x). The age space must also be partitioned–since in a ﬁnite horizon problem the
maximum age for the economy is T , we assume that from X := [0, T ] a set Px of nx
grid points is selected. Again, denote for exposition a typical element of Px by xk ∈ Px,
k = 1, . . . nx.
With these partitions, a given state s for v(t, s) is actually an nx-dimensional vector
s = (s1, s2, . . . , snx) ∈ (Ps)nx .
To compute the solutions (4.2) requires that s(T, x) be speciﬁed for all (ns)
nx possible grid
points. This allows the integrals in the ﬁrst order conditions to be computed with respect
to s(T, xk) at each point xk ∈ Px, which allows in turn the computation of c∗(T, xk) and
p∗(T ).
We shall return to the now obvious ‘curse of dimensionality’ problem just stated in a
moment, and will assume that the optimal controls c∗ and p∗ have been found. The next
step in the dynamic programming problem is to solve (3.9), i.e.
−∂v
∂t
=
∫ T
0
u(c∗(T, x)s(T, x)dx +
∫ T
0
∂v
∂s(T, x)
· (−µ(x, p∗(T ))s(T, x)dx (4.3)
for the value function v(t, s). This can be performed in a variety of ways–one may approx-
imate the PDE itself using ﬁnite diﬀerence methods (as we do here), or use the integral
form of the expression for ﬁnite volume methods, or approximate the solution of the PDE
instead and use ﬁnite element methods. We choose to use ﬁnite diﬀerence methods here
simply because they are straightforward to implement, and preliminary simulation results
indicated that they are less prone to spurious oscillations (as occurred with ﬁnite volume
methods).
The simplest ﬁnite diﬀerence approximation of the above system approximates the
derivatives appearing in the expression by small changes along the predeﬁned grid points
for s, x and t. We partition the time interval [0, T ] into a grid, and use the Hamilton-
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Jacobi-Bellman equation to approximate a small time step backward. To this end, deﬁne
the set of grid points over [0, T ] by Pt, with nt points, and a typical element of Pt by
tn ∈ Pt, n = 1, . . . , nt.
For added simplicity, we presume that all grid partitions are equidistant, so that we
can use the standard notation for expression ﬁnite diﬀerences on grid points. For example,
the partition of [0, T ] is into nt − 1 equal subintervals of width ∆t = Tnt−1 , and we can
express the nth interval by n∆t, with n = 1, . . . , nt − 1. A function value deﬁned on a
time grid point n will carry a superscript, so that if e.g. y is a function of time, then yn is
the value of the function at grid point n. We assume that both grid partitions for s and
x are also equidistant, and that the policy function p(t) is partitioned over Pt.
Note again a feature not common for standard ﬁnite diﬀerence models–as described
before, s(t, x) is deﬁned for all x, so that there are (ns)
nx grid points which represent the
discrete approximation of the continuous state space. Thus, a function y which is deﬁned
over (t, s) will carry the indices ynk1,...,knx , where each of the ki takes represents a grid point
from Ps. This means that as the grid over x becomes ﬁner, the number of dimensions of
the problem increases. This is diﬀerent from a standard ﬁnite diﬀerence model, where an
increasingly ﬁne grid means that more computations must be performed per dimension,
but not that the number of dimensions itself increases.
Armed with this notation we begin with a backward diﬀerence approximation to the
time derivative of the value function, i.e.
∂v
∂t
 v
n
k − vn−1k
∆t
, n = T, T − 1, . . . , 2,
where k represents an nx-dimensional vector of indices for the point s(·, xj), j = 1, . . . , nx.
Notice that because we are working in a dynamic programming environment, the dis-
cretization of s(t, x) is independent of t—we are forming the closed-loop policy functions
c∗(t, x) and p∗(t), so we must compute the value function for every admissible point in the
state space (regardless of whether or not actual state trajectories achieve these points).
Discretizing the rest of the system is more involved, and requires a re-examination of
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the ﬁrst order conditions (4.2). First, we note that in the expression for c∗(T, x), there is
a partial derivative of the value function VT and a partial derivative of the mortality rate
µ. The latter partial derivative is straightforward, but the former partial derivative is a
functional derivative with respect to s(t, x). In other words, considering any perturbation
h(t, x) of s(t, x) such that
‖h(t, ·)‖ :=
∫ t
0
h(t, x)dx = 1 ∀t,
we deﬁne the (Gaˆteaux) derivative of v(t, s) with respect to s by
∂v
∂s
:=
d
dα
v(t, s + αh)
∣∣∣∣
α=0
,
where α ∈ R is a scalar. The reason we denote this derivative by ∂v
∂s
instead of dv
ds
, as is
mathematically correct, is that in order to approximate this derivative on a discretized
grid, we must take the derivative for every point in Px, i.e. for each of nx diﬀerent points
there exists a diﬀerent derivative. We could have speciﬁed this derivative as e.g. dv
dsj
,
but the partial derivative notation is more suggestive–it represents the fact that in reality
the dependence of one function upon another, which in turn depends upon an underlying
continuous space, is actually a dependence of one function upon a continuum of functions
(‘indexed’, if you will, by the points in the underlying space). To compute a meaningful
variation in the value function v for variations in s on a computer, then, requires that the
discretization keep track of how many points in the underlying space (here X) are used
for its approximation (here Px).
Armed with this intuition we can proceed to the actual discretization of the partial
derivative ∂v
∂s
. The discretized version is:
∂v
∂s
∣∣∣∣
(t,x)
 ∆svnkj :=
vnk − vnk−1j
∆js
, (4.4)
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where the notation k−1j means
k−1j := (k1, . . . , kj−1, kj − 1, . . . , knx), j = 1, . . . , nx,
and ∆jS represents
∆jS := Skj − Skj−1.
(The notation for the ﬁnite diﬀerence approximation ∆sv
n
kj of
∂v
∂s
will be used below.)
Approximation (4.4) is a backward partial diﬀerence operation, where the value func-
tion v at time t is evaluated ﬁrst at a grid point (Sk1, . . . , Sknx ), and then at a neighboring
point (Sk1, . . . , Skj−1, Skj−1, Skj+1, . . . , Sknx ). These values are subtracted and then divided
by ∆jS, so that the total represents the jth partial derivative of v(t, s) at the underlying
grid point xj .
The backward diﬀerence approximation for ∂µ
∂p
is more straightforward:
∂µ
∂p
 ∆pµnj :=
µnj − µn−1j
∆p
, (4.5)
where ∆p is the interval from partitioning the grid for values of the policy function p. As
above, ∆pµ
n
j represents this ﬁnite diﬀerence approximation to
∂µ
∂p
.
The functional form of µ given by Assumption 4.1 admits a closed-form solution for
the exact derivative, and this is what is used in the numerical computations here. But
when the functional form of µ is an outcome of an underlying model, which may not
admit a closed-form solution, the use of a numerical derivative such as that in (4.5) will
be necessary.
The ﬁnite diﬀerence approximation for c∗(t, x) for any period t can now be speciﬁed:
c∗(t, x)  cnkj =
[−∆svnkj∆pµnj ]−1 , n = nt, . . . , 1. (4.6)
In similar fashion, the policy function p∗(t) may be approximated, using the solution
(4.2)–we express the numerical integral which must be computed in a generic format
25
below, but any numerical integration method (quadrature, rhomberg, trapezoidal, etc.)
may be used. The approximation is:
p∗(t)  pnk = 1−
nx∑
j=1
cnkjskj∆xj , n = nt, . . . , 1. (4.7)
Once the optimal policies have been discretized the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
can also be approximated. Recall that for the left hand side of (4.3) we have
∂v
∂t
 v
n
k − vn−1k
∆t
. (4.8)
The right hand side of (4.3) is another numerical integral (again, this is a generic
template for the integral):
∫ t
0
[
u(c∗(t, x))− ∂v
∂s
· (µ(x, p∗(t))
]
s(t, x)dx 
nx∑
j=1
[
ln
(
cnkj
)−∆svnkjµ(xj , pnk)] skj∆xj . (4.9)
Finally, we can combine (4.8) and (4.9) to yield
vn−1k = v
n
k +
nx∑
j=1
[
ln
(
cnkj
)−∆svnkjµ(xj , pnk)] skj∆xj∆t, (4.10)
with cnkj and p
n
k deﬁned as in (4.6) and (4.7), respectively.
4.3 The algorithm
The algorithm proceeds in standard fashion, starting from the terminal period T :
1. the grid sizes nt, ns and nx are chosen, and the grid partitions are formed. For x,
the age space [0, T ] is used at the beginning, deﬁning ∆x = T
nx−1 . Let an index
counter i = 1, let n = nt, and v
n
kj := VT (xj).
2. Compute optimal policies cnkj and p
n
k for every state sk and (in the case of consump-
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tion) underlying index grid point j. This involves the computation of ∆sv
n
kj and
∆pµ
n
j .
3. The next iteration vn−1k is computed from (4.10).
4. The age space is redeﬁned to [0, T − i∆t] and new grid points for x are chosen, with
∆x = T−i∆t
nx−1 .
4 Let n = nt − i. Finally, let i = i + 1.
5. Repeat algorithm from 2 until i = nt.
5 Algorithm Convergence, Viscosity Solutions
Algorithm convergence is an open question and will be addressed in future research, as will
the relative merits of the ‘naive’ ﬁnite diﬀerencing outlined above vs. a more sophisticated
solution method using the viscosity approach (see. e.g. Crandall and Lions [1984, 1983]
for a comprehensive treatment of this method for solving HJB systems).
4This can be automated in the computation of the numerical integrals, where this partition is used.
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